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There is an inherent tension between the idea that individuals have
certain inalienable (natural) rights and the economist's postulate that
the rate of utilization of anything whose production requires scarce
resources must be limited by considerations of opportunity cost. Remarks
about rights to life, liberty, health, justice and the like arereadily
inserted into political pronouncements, legislative preambles and court
decisions, but they (should) cause economists to raise questions about
costs and quantities.
Unfortunately, neither in ordinary language nor in the jargon of
moral philosophy can such ultimate desiderata as liberty andjustice be
related to costs or quantities. Hence in the first sectionwe sketch a model
of social choice in which the necessary relationshipscan be defined. En
section II, we give instances where, despite protestationsto the contrary,
the Law Enforcement System (LES) has made de facto reductions ofcitizen
rights (liberties) in order to increase the efficiency of law enforcement.'
The final section considers some of the normativeimplications suggested
by the positive arguments of section II.
I. The Tradeoff Between Citizen Rights and theEfficiency of LES
For the purpose of this paper, I shall consider theconcept of an
individual's "right" to do something or other to be the denialof the
propriety of the state taking action to reduce his utility if heexercises
said right. Thus an individual's right of freedom, ofspeech is the denial2.
of the propriety of the state's visiting any punishmentupon him because
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of his exercising said right to (protected) speech.An individual may
also have, or be granted, rights to receive certain benefits from the
state; e.g., a right to some minimum level of income or of health care.
The state is not powerless to infringe the rights of theindividual.
Obviously, the contrary is true when all branches of governmentagree
to the infringement. Indeed, much discussion about therights of citizens
reflects concern that the government might infringe them.Consequently,
the definition of citizen rights against the statemust run in terms of
moral rather than positive limits upon the state'sability to command or
forbid actions of individuals. In the context of thispaper, citizen
rights are defined as constraints upon the technology LESmay employ in
pursuit of its objectives. For example, the right of an individualto
freedom from unreasonable search limits the ability of thestate to use
information gathered as a result of unlawfulentry as evidence, much as
2
would technological incapacity to acquire the information
Considering LES to be engaged in a process of constrained optimiza-
tion, its activities are limited by the rights of its citizensas well as
by technology. For our particular purpose, it is convenientto assume that
the sole objective of LES is the repression of aparticular type of crime,
for example street crime. For simplicity assume that theproduction function
of LES is completely separable from that of all otheractivities of the
government and of all households and firms in the economy.
Assume, initially, that the utility (objective) function of the
director of LES contains only one argument, an inverse ofa (valid) index
of the extent of street crime. Also assume that allhuman agents employed
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by LES are similarly motivated so long as they remain in thisemployment.3.
All prices and tax rates, both of inputs and outputs, are parameters for the
director of LES whose operations are determined by his budget, B, and by
the technology for combatting street crime. B is discussed below and the
technology is determined by (2).
U =f(Y,W, R, I) (1)
WY+B (la)
U =f*(B,R, I) (ib)
F(I, S, R, B) =0 (2)
F*(I, B, R) =0 (2a)
The arguments of (2) are B; the inverse index of street crime, I;
S, the supply of street crime, and a vector of citizen rights, R, of which
Rj is a typical element. As will be seen, the higher the level of other
elements of R the same, the more rights citizens have against the state and
the more restricted are the procedures LES can use to detect and repress
street crime. That is, citizen rights limit the technological choices
available to LES in that an increase in ceteris paribus, will be asso-
ciated with a lower level of I (more Street crime). Similarly, greater
levels of S are (ceteris paribus) associated with lower levels of I.
Equation (1) is a citizen's utility or personal choice function
over alternative states of the world. In (1), W represents wealth,
including human capital. That part of W that is used publicly or privately tc
produce services other than repression of street crime is designated as Y.
Wealth used to repress street crime is designated as B. I is the inverse
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index of Street crime, and R is citizen rights.
(1) is not an aggregate social welfare function. It should be4.
interpreted as express:[ng the preference ordering over alternative states
of the world of a more or less typical citizen who does notexpect to commit
street crimes.In effect, (1) is the preference function of an advisor
to LES who prefaces his remarks by saying "this reflectsmy preferences,
are yours very different?" Whenever the answer Is affirmative, we must
consider as many variants of (1) as there are distinguishablepreference
orderings.
In principle, where there Is great diversity of preferenceorderings,
there could be a distinct variant of (1) for each individual..In this event,
the interest of an argument such as is offeredhere, which presumes a common
set of preferences, would disappear. Obviously, I believe thepreferences
reflected in the argument of this paper are widely sharedamong law abiding
citizens.
=
clg(wc,W, wj, u, T) ic (3)
S =
ZSg (4)
Now let us consider the supply of street crime,Sg determined by
(3). For each individual,9g is defined as the utility maximizing quantity
of time devoted to this activity, the choice variables being timespent
in various possible activIties, 1, 2 ———k.Each activity (except street
crime) is assumed to have a sure time rate of pecuniary reward,w1, if it
Involves the sale of labor services; or to yield a sure time rate ofmar—
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ginal utility, uh, If it is performed within the household. (For all
activities performed in positive quantities, utility maximizationrequires
thatw + -=uh.)
Streetcrime has an expected pecuniary return per hour,w1, which5.
increases with per capita wealth and diminishe with the expected punishment
per hour devoted to Street crime. It is assumed that the probability of
apprehension per hour of activity is determined by the transformation function,
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(2), given R andB.It is also assumed that the expected loss of utility
conditional upon apprehension, is determined as part of R.
That is, R is a vector some elements of which, R1, reflect the rights
of accused (but unconvicted) persons. Other elements of R, R2, reflect the
rights of convicted persons. Given the circumstances of apprehension, R1
determines the probability of conviction; given conviction, R2 determines the
expected sentence. (LB. Assuming R to have Rm elements, Rm ? +R2.)
Assumethattheprobability of apprehension per hour of street crime is
determined by B and R3 (therights that inhibit apprehension). Then the
reduction in expected utility (because of punishment) resulting from an
additional hour devoted to street crime, u, will also be determined. The
(expected) marginal utility of minutes per time interval devoted to street
crime will, be
w- + uc + ; u<O.
8
dx y 9XC C
The individual's supply of Street crime,5g' is given by (3) where
> 0, < 0, < 0, 4'<0 and 4>0;i.e., ceteris paribus, the c i c
supply of Street crime (hours per week) increases with the return per hour
spent at Street crime; decreases with the hourly wage rate at other activI-
ties, with wealth (it is an inferior activity) and with the marginal (loss)
of expected utility on account of punishment. Finally, it increases with T,
the taste for engaging in Street crime, which we treat as exogenous. For
most g, 5g over the relevant ranges of all arguments of (3), but the6.
aggregate supply, S, is determined by gl 5g as iidicated by (4).
u =p(B,R, T) (5)
quation (5) gives the expected loss of utility on account of punish-
ment by LES per additional minute spent at Street crime as a function of
B, R, and T. < o,becausegreater citizen rights reduce (1) the
3R
probability of apprehension; (2) the probability of conviction, given appre-
hension, and (3) the degree of punishment, given conviction. > 0, as both
the probability of apprehension and the probability of conviction, given
apprehension, increase with expenditure on enforceiient, ceteris paribus.
< 0, because the probability of apprehension diminishes with the volume
of street crime which increases with T, q >0), given B and R.
Consider (1) —(5)as a system determining the resource allocations
that will be proposed to the "sovereign" by a citizen—advisor whose utility
function is given by (1). His utility, U, increases with total wealth
whether the wealth is used to repress street crime or otherwise. Hence,
Uy>O andUB>O.
U is also assumed to increase, with R and with I. UR > 0 may be
rationalized in various ways: the simplest is that the greater are citizen
rights against the state, the greater is the set of actions an individual
may undertake that are lawful; i.e. the greater the number of actions
that are permitted without risk of punishment. U > 0 is explained above.
W and B are related by the identity, (la). In effect, (la) divides commu-
nity wealth, without remainder, into that used to repress street crime, and
that used for all other purposes.
(1) is maximized subject to the constraint of (2) which represents
the technology of crime repression.(2) relates the possible levels of I7.
that may be obtained with various allocations of wealth to repression of
street crime (as indicated by B), given R and S. It is assumed that the
resource quanta used in repressing street crime are sufficiently small
so that all factor prices may be treated as parameters in constructing
(2). We ignore the possibility of substituting private protection for pub-
lic activity in repression of street crime, for the immediatepurpose,
private protection against crime is assumed exogenous and constant
Since W plays no active role in our argument., wemayaswell assume
it constant and, substituting (la) into (1), derive (lb) which will here-
after serve as our maximand We assume that B has no effectupon U through
(1), for given W, B operates on U only via its effect on Y in (la), Ie
dB—dY, W constantBecause U > 0, at any point on (2), W constant,
UB < 0R is a vector of paramenters (inversely) related to the efficacy
of B in repressing Street crime, i e R determines the effect of Bupon
I, given S.
The interpretation given to R is that it represents the Inverse of
the cost of information about Street criminal activitiesFor simplicity,
it is assumed that all obstacles to apprehension, conviction and(some)
punishment of criminals are the result of LES lack of informationIf R
were set sufficiently low (e g if every individual had to get specific
permission to leave his house and was required to give a detailed account
of all time spent outside) Street crime might be reducedto zero. Conversely,
if R were made great enough (e.g. if no one couldever be punished for
committing an offense unless he confessed, and no inducements orpressure
to confess were permitted) criminal activity might becomevery greatR
is scaled so that 4>0; i.e. greater citizen rights, ceteris paribus,
add to utility. The construction of both (1) and(2) assumes that the prices
of all products and factors are given andindependent of the values chosen8.
for R, B, and I. Similarly, it is assumed that all tax rates, subsidies
and "free"gifts of the government are independent of R, B and I.
Accordingly, for given I and S, there Is a tradeoff between R and
B. For example, with increased rights against police interrogation, a
larger number of policemen on the street are required to hold constant the
probability of conviction (the compound probability of apprehension and
of conviction given apprehension) given the offense. But, in order to hold
I constant, it is not sufficient to consider the tradeoff between B and R
alone. For (2) also involves S which, through uc and (5), depends upon B,
R and T. Hence, to determine the tradeoff between B and R, I constant, it
is also necessary to fix T.
With given T, we may substitute (5) into (3) and (4) into (2)
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yielding (2a).T is an indicator of the willingness of individuals to
engage in street crime given the loss (per offense) in expected utility on
account of possible punishment. Ceteris paribus,greater Twill cause
greater S, requiring either greater B, lower R or a combination of both, if
I is not to fall.
Maximizing (lb) subject to (2a) gives us the familiar first order
maximum conditions, (6), for an individual for whom T is sufficiently low
so that s =0for all relevant values of the other exogenous variables,
wj and W. (I.e. (lb) is assumed to refer to a law abiding citizen.)
Restricting the argument to law abiding citizens is necessary in order to
posit U > 0. For individuals who might consider committing some Street
crime, given particular values of the exogenous variables, it is not obvious
that U will increase with I. (The implications of this are discussed below,
pp. .)Thethree equations of (6) plus (lb) and (2a), five equations







The implications of the model for the operation of LES can easily be
seen from Figure 1 on whose vertical axis we measure B (in dollars) and
on whose horizontal axis is measured any one element of R, other elements
constantThe I curves indicate Increasingly high levels of crime avoidance
*
(lowlevels of crime) and the constraint, F,isconstructed on the assump-
tion of the following datawealth, expenditure on objects other than crime
repression, technology for repressing (street) crime, taste for committing
crime and relevant prices
The I curves express the idea that it is possible to attain a given
degree of success in repressing criminal activity, given the taste for
engaging in such activity, by various combinations of expenditure on LES and
restriction of citizen rightsIt is possible to save money on law enforce-
ment without suffering more criminal activity, by reducing the rights of
individuals against the state. As already indicated the saving may be
interpreted as a reduction in the cost to LES of securing relevant information
by restricting the range of (lawfully) permitted activities by individuals.
In particular, law enforcement activity may be made more efficient by reducing
the citizen's rights of privacy.
From one point of view, all that the preceding two paragraphs contain
is a recitation of what Is implied by cost minimization in the achievement
of a specified objective. But from another standpoint, what has been assumed
is constitutionally and, some would argue, morally Impermissible: i.e.
citizen rights are assumed to be choice variables at the discretion of the10.
state to be balanced against the cost of the r?sources required to attain
a given degree of crime repression. In the language and Weltanschauung of
(certain types of) Civil Libertarians, the rights of individuals are
absolute——inalienable——and not subject to limitation for any social purpose
whatever. So viewed rights are constraints, subject to which utility is
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maximized, andnotvariables to be manipulated by asocial choice maker.
The level of I that a choice maker will select cannot be determined
from figure 1. But in figure 2, I is determined, for given values of W
and R. The vertical axis of figure 2 measures levels of I; the horizontal
axis measures Y, expenditure (both public and private) for all purposes
other than repression of street crime; and the isoquants are conventional
indifference curves giving alternative combinations of I and Y that yield
equal utility. The resource constraint is determined by W, R and T; its
concavity to the origin reflects the increasing marginal cost of producing
higher levels of crime repression by greater expenditure thereupon with given
enforcement techniques; tastes for criminal activities and citizen rights
constant.
In figure 2, optimization occurs at A. Ceteris paribus, if W were
greater, higher levels of both I and Y would be attainable. Similarly, with
better techniques of crime repression, more of both I and *f could be obtained
with given W and R; or given T, W, Y and technique, more I could be obtained
by sacrifice of a given "quantum" of R. In other words, if the social
chooser were not so avid for services other than crime repression he could
have more crime repression at a given level of citizen rights; or more of
rights and services (other than crime repression) if only he would tolerate
more criminal activity. Of course, none of these tradeoffs would be
necessary for attaining higher levels of both I and Y if only the taste for






A few remarks on the interpretation of (1) and/or (ib)may help avoid
misunderstanding. Let me reiterate that (1) is a utility function referring
to the preference function of a lawabiding citizen; i.e. one who does not
intend to commit any street crime at any set of values of theexogenous
variables that have a non—zero probability of occurring. Consequently,given
W and w1, reducing the expected yield of an hour in street criminalactivity
(by lowering R) implies redistributing welfare against actual or potential
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criminals and in favor of law abiders.
As previously remarked (n. 3) the specification of (I) assumesaway
any question of performance incentives by law enforcement officials. In
effect, it is assumed that judges, police officers, correctional officials,
etc., all behave as prescribed by a detailed set of written rules which are
in accord with the utility function, (1). That is, we assume there is
neither "shirkingt' nor over—zealousness by the officials of LES.
Oviously, this assumption will never hold, literally, and it is made
only to avoid distracting complications. However, the assumption is not
without important consequences. One (good) reason why Civil Libertarians
have been prone (in effect) to insist upon very large savings in Bas
recompense for small decreases in R is their distrust of police motivation.
That is, they profess to believe that out of indolence or hostility, police
officers will use discretion granted them by a low R unnecessarily to reduce
the utility of citizens (law abiding and otherwise) below what isnecessary
12
to attain a given level of I.
To the extent that one is concerned with this possibility, his speci-
fication of f (or f*) in (1) will vary. Thus, an extreme libertarian could
readily accept our formulation of the problem but set R very high and make
it very inelastic with respect to variations in the marginal rate of trans—13.
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formation between R and B. The argument Qf section II is designed to
indicate that there has been, in fact, an appreciable willingness to sub-
stitute R for B in the face of changes in the tradeoff between them, but
this need not convince those who profoundly distrust the personnel of LES.
II. Citizen Rights, Expenditure on LES and Criminal Activity:
A Positive View
Let us assume that if LES had complete information on the activities
of every person in the community at every moment he was outside his
domicile, Street crime would be reduced to zero. That is, if everyone had
to submit a detailed and verified minute—by—minute account of his activities
from the moment he left his domicile until the moment he returned, the
probability of committing an undetected street crime would be zero, and the
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supply would also be reduced to zero. B given, I would then be raised
to its conceptual upper limit, and R reduced to its lower limit; i.e. street
crime would be eliminated but at the expense of virtually eliminating the
citizen's right of privacy once he left his home.
In order for the citizen to account for all his extra—domiciliary
time to the satisfaction of LES, he would either have to hire approved
witnesses to accompany him wherever he went——a very expensive matter—or
restrict his movements to areas where they could be monitored more economically
(e.g. by television camera). But if he were to confine himself to certain
well policed or well lighted areas, where the risk that street crime would
be committed was minimal, LES might be able (without adverse effectson I)
to relieve him of the obligation to provide a verified log of his movements.
The various alternative sets of requirements on individuals toreport their14.
street movements may be thought of as elements of the (alternative) sets of
inputs that might be used to produce given levels of I. Among the other
(input) elements would be, for example, police Eurveillance and street
lights, increases in either of which entail increases in B.
As suggested above, I may be assumed to vary inversely with LES infor-
mation. This information reaches its conceptual maximum when the location
of every individual at every moment of time (spent outside hIs domicile) is
known with certainty. This upper limit to information may be approached
either by (a) restricting the possible movements of individuals and/or
increasing the requirements for self—reporting çalternative ways of reducing
R) or by (b) increasing the number of policemen who observe and report on
street activity (increasing B).
It is not, I think, descriptively accurate to assume that societies
(or their LES') act to maintain fixed values of I in the face of variations
in T, W, etc. De facto, sharp increases in T (or decreases in W) are likely
to be accompanied by increases in the societally tolerated level of I.
Moreover, the interrelated effects upon I, B and R that would result from
changes in any (or all) of the above exogenous variables are not well known
which necessarily inhibit any institutional arrangements that would involve
explicit variations in B and R in response to changes in their relative
efficiency prices. Nevertheless, I suggest that as a first approximation it
is useful to treat B and R as substitute inputs (in the production of I),
whose relative quantities vary in a conventional manner in response to
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changes in their relative prices.
That is, where the utility of preventing a particular crime is very
great,and the marginal cost of "equally effective" police surveillance
prohibitive, there is a tendency to reduce R in lieu of indefinitelyincreasing15.
B. For instance, when highly placed governent officials (native or foreign)
travel down a public thoroughfare, normal use and access to said street is
restricted——in addition to greater use of police——in order to provide adequate
protection. Such temporary reduction of R are usually accepted without
complaint, though the principle would be unacceptable were it applied generall'
Another example to the same point occurred in Quebec in October 1970,
when the Minister of Labor of the Province of Quebec and a British Trade
Representative were kidnapped and held for ransom by French—Canadian
revolutionaries. In what proved to be a vain hope of finding the kidnapped
persons before they were murdered, the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre
Trudeau, invoked emergency powers that vastly extended normal police rights
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of search, rights to restrict movement of citizens from place toplace, etc.
More generally, in situations where riots or natural disasters (such
as earthquakes, major fires and the like), civil wars or foreign invasions
have occurred, or are in immediate prospect, martial law or anapproximation
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thereto frequently has been imposed. In all of these situations the
rationale of government behavior is that there has been (or is about to be)
a transitory disturbance to normal communications that reduces the efficacy
of marginal expenditure on LES to apprehend offenders. Hence, theexpected
return per hour devoted to Street crime, and consequently the quantity
supplied, would Increase unless offsetting measures were taken.
The very events that lower the crime—reducing efficacy ofexpenditure
on LES also make it difficult quickly to remedy matters——prevent I from
falling sharply——by increasing B. That is, in circumstances such as the above
it is (temporarily) difficult to hire additional policemen, toprovide them
with vehicles, to assemble trial facilities, etc.Moreover, in many of these
situations, there is a breakdown of normal private protection (e.g. windows16.
are broken, possessions are left unguarded in public places, protective
structures are devastated) which further increases the return to criminal
activity. As a result, in the short run there is a tendency to meet an
increased demandforcrime repression by reducing R as well as by increasing
B.
This might suggest the hypothesis that although R is rigid (more or
less) in the long run, it varies to offset transitory variations in the
parameters of F* so as to limit variations in I. Indeed, I would conjecture
that R is less volatile in the long run than in the short. However, I would
not concede that the long run value of R is an institutional constant,
independent of the relative cost—effectiveness of R and B in repressing
crime. Consider the following cases: (1) the increase in airplane hijack-
ings during the past few years has led to an appreciable curtailment of the
right of privacy of anyone wishing to board a commercial airplane. Now, all
travelers must submit to a search of their hand luggage and to an electronic
search of their.persons to detect metal objects. Obviously, the rationale
of this procedure is the very high cost of submitting to hijackers' demands.
This example of search without a warrant appears likely to continue
indefinitely.
(2) The practice of customs inspection (of citizens as well as
foreigners) is long—standing and virtually unchallenged. Yet it is an invasion
of privacy (without search warrant) that would not be countenanced in connec-
tion with intra—country movement. The rationa for this difference between
official search behavior at ports of entry into a country, and elsewhere,
must lie in the belief that the cost of detecting violaticns of customs
regulations at any time after merchandise enters a country is enough greater
than at the time of entry to justify the necessary reduction in R.17.
(3) The insitution of the curfew is—-'or was—— of long-standing use
and served to limit the nocturnal activities of individuals. Often, the
curfew has bee.idifferentially applied among individuals distinguished by
age and (less frequently) race and sex with the apparent purpose of differ-
entially reducing the rights of those judged more likely to commit various
17
species of crimes. Vagrancy laws, recently subjected to much attack in
the courts, were similarly motivated; i.e. vagrants were judged more likely
18
to commit crimes than others.
(4) The terms on which bail is offered to individuals accused of
crimes vary inversely both with the probability that they will appear for
trial (i.e. they vary inversely with the expected cost of preventing the
crime of fleeing justice) and with the probability that they will commit
19
further offenses prior to trial. In other words, the rights of accused
persons are varied to limit the cost to LES of keeping I below a certain
limit. Similar observations apply to the sentencing and paroling persons
convicted of crimes.
(5) Priorto about 1960,"honor codes" served as methods of enforcing
regulations in educational institutions, especially as regards cheating on
examinations. They served both to limit the cost of "law enforcement" to
college administrations and to permit a large degree of citizen (student)
rights without causing an unacceptably high level of violations. These
codes apparently worked reasonably well so long as T did not exceed the levels
customary in academic communities prior to 1960. However, for whatever
reason,there has been a sharp rise in T since then which has greatly reduced
the level of I attainable under an honor codeand forced adoptions of more
costlymethods (e.g. proctoring) of policingexaminations.
Another example to the same point is the adoption of a policy
requiring all users of college libraries to submit to inspection of books,18.
brief cases, etc. being taken from the building. On many campuses, this
policy is of relatively recent origin and apparently resulted from a
sharp increase in book thefts. While this policy entails an increase in
pecuniary outlay (e.g. for inspectors), its important consequence is that
it involves a reduction in rights of privacy——right of library users to
avoid search without a warrant——as a response to an increase in I resulting
20
from an increase in T.
This list is intended as illustrative rather than exhaustive. Its
purpose is simply to suggest to the reader that variation in individual
rights of privacy against the state (among situations, locations, and cate-
gories of individuals) may be interpreted as the consequence of differences
in the cost-effectiveness of dollars spent on LES. Or, to make the same
point in different words, political and legal institutions act, however
uncertainly, to substitute reductions in R for increases in B in response
to (long run) differences in their cost—effectiveness in raising I.
III. Some Normative Implications of the Argument
Societies tend in fact to substitute limitatiQns upon individual rights
for expenditure upon LES as a response to differences (or changes) in the
cost effectiveness of dollars spent on R and B. But this implies nothing as
to what the relation between B and R, I constant, should be. Is cannot imply
ought. Yet, if there has been a tendency for the LES to treat B and R as
substitutes in societies usually considered as free, then it is not opposite
to argue that to use variations in R as a means to limit I, B constant, is
flirting with totalitarianism.
It will not be seriously denied that there is a strong current in19.
recent legal and philosophical thinking, paralleling recent Supreme Court
decisions, to the effect that the rights of individuals are absolute and
not limited by "needs of society." However, if the argument of section II
is valid, then what we have considered hitherto as free societies have
operated with combinations of R and B varying more or less in response to
changes in the relative prices of inputs requisite to achieving acceptable
levels of I. Attempts to set R with reference solely to ethical considera-
tions might well result in completely unacceptable combinations of B and I.
What has been meant by a "free society under law" is not definable in terms
of R alone, but in terms of combinations of R, B and I. Given F*, an ethical
determination of R may be simply incompatible with the utility function, (lb).
The normative question of choice among alternative combinations of
I, B and R is frequently obscured by reluctance to face up to the moral
implications of a subjective tradeoff between B and R, I constant. This
tradeoff may be interpreted as the shadow price of citizen rights in terms
of dollars used to support LES. Many people like to believe that their
own subjective tradeoff between these two variables is infinite: i.e.
that in their utility function "free&in," or certain components thereof,
have no price.
The attitude that freedom, the elements of the Bill of Rights, etc.
are unconditioned by circumstances and (surely) not by the budgetary exi-
gencies of LES, is an important part of those civic homilies which may not
be challenged, however much they may be flouted. However, I contend not
only that these homilies have been flouted in fact, but that in principle
they may be counter—productive, and that a higher level of U in (lb) might
be attainable if LES were not forced topay lip service to an excessively
simplistic code of politico—legal morals.
For example, given a court system whose speed ofoperation is unre—20.
sponsive to the back—log of cases awaiting trial combined with the right to
bail, a rise in street crime is likely to lead to an unusually large number
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of street criminals at large, and therefore to a higher I. One possible
method of preventing such an increase in I would be to limit access to bail,
possibly compensating those imprisoned before trial but later found innocent.
Whether this method of reducing I is adopted should depend upon (a) the
marginal impact on I of reducing the number of untried persons free on bail,
and(b)the marginal effect on U of reducing I, but (simultaneously) impri-
soning some innocent individuals. But it is difficult for legislatures
explicitly to consider the costs and benefits of pretrial imprisonment,
whatever they may be, because under present court rulings the constitutional
rights of the accused to bail may not be subordinated to the social objective
of reducing crime.
In reality, as Landes' evidence indicates, judges use their discre-
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tionary power in setting bail to limit I. However, they must do this
surreptitiously, and occasionally the bail originally set has been reduced
by higher courts on the grounds that bail was excessive for the purpose of
insuring attendance at the trial. Surely, there would be greater clarity
concerning the nature and function of LES, and possibly greater efficiency in
its operation, were it possible explicitly to consider (e.g. in the bail
determination process) the social utility of confining the accused, as well
as the probability that he will appear for trial.
As I have already argued,, whatever their rhetoric, the courts have
tended to recognize and balance societal objectives against individual
rights in deciding what legislative restrictions on the latter are const—
tutionally permissible. Despite the recent concern with First Amendment
rights, the Holmesian dictum against the unlimited right to cry "Fire" has
not been seriously disputed. The real questions are how to strike the balance21.
among competing desiderata and who should strike it; the courts, legislature
23
or some interaction of the two.
To interpret citizen rights as absolute restraints on LES action Is
In effect to deny, or seek to deny, courts the authority to concedeto the
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legislature discretion in choosing among sets of R, B and I. A valid
rationale for thus limiting the discretion of judges in maintaining citizen
rights derives from distrust of public officials, however chosen. Theoreti-
cally, certain rights of citizens are held to be inviolable. In practice,
as we have seen, time and circumstance causes legislatures to alter these
rights, and the courts to acquiesce in the alternations.
De facto, the consitutional guarantees of citizen rights do not
absolutely prohibit their alteration, but rather Impose a kind of tax (in
time and trouble) on actions that alter R. It is the function of thecourts
(somehow) to levy and collect this quasi—tax: they perform this function
variously by insisting that legislation limiting R be shown necessary to
achieve a legitimate objective of government; by insisting that R be restrict
no more than is required to achieve an (legitimate) objective; by engaging
In "rear—guard" delaying type actions to protect particularrights, though
ultimately yielding in the face of persistent legislative attempts to limit
them, etc.
The insitution of judicial review is not the only method ofmaking
certain types of legislative decisions especially costly.Requirements for
more than bare majorities (e.g. 2/3 or 3/4 of all legislators voting)as a
condition for enacting certain types of laws; a requirement for twoseparate
votes with a minimum time interval between them; a requirement fora referen-
dum in addition to legislative enactment, andmany other constitutional
provisions serve to impede (tax) the adoption of certain types of legislative
measures, as well as invalidation through judicial review.22.
In other words, protection of citizen rights against infringement is
merely one method by which citizen—delegators (niployers) of control over
public resources attempt to hedge against the risk that governmental officials
25
(agents) will violate the conditions upon which this control is delegated.
The reason for such hedging is that, barring flukes, the interaction of the
utility function of the agent and the incentive structure under which he
operates will lead to behavior different from that desired by the delegators.
Thus, members of LES may attempt to make their jobs easier than their con-
tracts imply (e.g. shirk their tasks) by reducing R below what was anticipated
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by those who delegated authority to LES. Morover, the utility loss from
such shirking may be very large; the rights losl or diminshed may have great
utility to citizens and the cost of regaining a right abridged by a more
or less casual governmental decision may be very great.
More generally, it is not only citizen rights that may be protected
in this manner, but the rights of any employer or delegator against the
actions of an agent who exceeds his authority; i.e. one who acts ultra vires.
In the case of delegation to private parties, appeal may be made to the
courts to enforce respect for the terms of delegation. In many cases,
delegation of power to public bodies, even legislatures, may also be hedged
by specific limitations (e.g. total debt may not exceed a certain limit
unless explicitly authorized) that can be enforced by appeal to the courts.
But, in some cases——in particular, the operation of LES, the cost of writing
specific limits to the authority of legislatures is too great (i.e. technical
capacity is too limited) and it is necessary that the courts interpret
delegative intent. Implicitly, this is accomplished by the courts operating
on a utility function such as (1) and proscribing legislative actions that
reduce R below what was intended by the delegators.
The actual process by which the courts protect citizen rights might23.
well be, on average, a reasonable approximation to one of minimizing the
loss of expected utility from "misbehavior" of LES. However, the public
rationalization of this process is very different, often being expressed as
though citizen rights——especially those related to freedom of speech, of
assembly and right of political opposition——ought to be immutable regardless
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of practical consequences. I disagree with this interpretation of citizen
rights.F—i
FOOTNOTES
11twould not usually be considered a violation of the right to freedom
of speech for the government to bribe an individual to speak, or refrain
from speaking in some particular way, although such bribery mightwellbe
considered bad public policy. However, if the government were to impose
very heavy wealth taxes whose incidence was independent of speech, and used
the revenue to purchase desired speech (or silence), a strong interaction
between fiscal action and freedom of speech would arise that might cause
difficulty for the definition (of freedom of speech) offered In the text
However, for the purpose of this paper, it is unnecessary to consider this
complication.
2This type of citizenright against the state is not the sole or neces-
sarily the most important type of right an individual may have. Hisproperty
rights, primarily against other individuals, are also of great importance,
but are not relevant to the subject of thispaper.
3This assumption is made to avoid theproblem of specifying the perfor—
inance incentives offered law enforcement officials. The Incentive problem
Is discussed by Becker and Stigler [fl,andbelow, p. 13.
4Formally, B is defined in (1) as the capitalizedbudget of LES. At
various places In the text, B will be treated as the time rate ofexpenditure
of LES. However, this dimensional ambiguity in noway affects the argument.F—2
5Obviously, rational individuals contemplatng the commission of one or
more street crimes will have different preferences for the allocation of
public resources, as between LES and other uses, than those who do not expect
ever to commit such acts. Our argument is directed solely to members of
this latter class of (law abiding) citizens.
6Assume a given individual, g, to have a utility function
u =u(y,C, x1, ___Xq)
which he maximizes subject to a time constraint t =x1+
X.
y=P+ w1 x1 + ———= Wx where y is pecuniary income which consists of
property income, P, plus wages for labor market activities, 1 through j.
w1 ———w
are the wage rates per unit of time spent at each of these activities
and x1 ———xare the respective amounts of time spent on them. q > j,
indicating that some uses of time are associated with no pecuniary compensa-
tion; i.e. are performed within the household.
C is expected (total punishment for all street crime committed by the
individual during the period under discussion. C =C(x,B, R),
c > 0, C > 0 and C < 0. Whether measured in dollars fined, days spent
c B R
in jail, or however, expected punishment increases with time devoted to
criminal activity; it also increases with expenditure on LES and diminishes
with citizen rights, R. Because of C,
.41L- = + C where < 0
dxcXc C c
A complete analysis of the problem would require inclusion of quanti-
ties of commodities consumed as arguments of U and addition of a second
constraint (reflecting wealth). However, this generalization would not be
to the present purpose and consequently I operate with only one constraintF—3
and no consumption activities in the utility function
Maximizing u subject to t, we obtain the first order condition for
all non—zero xh:
uh =._— 4!_ = 0(hj+l-——q),and
+w — = 0 (1 1 j) Xj
Since ---— —E !._ (a unit of time diverted to one activity must
ih axh
come from others), au + uw = ufor all non—zero
'iiTT i#hi
x's except x, activity devoted to Street crimeFor Xc,
du au
' = wc—+ uc + —=
dx Yc xc
where w is the mathematically expected rate of pecuniary returnper time
unit devoted to crime and u =.—, isthe expected loss of utility
on account of punishment per time unit in Street crimeSg is defined as
that value of Xc for which the maximum conditions are satisfied
Specification makes u depend solely upon the expected values and not
upon the higher moments of the probability distributions of the return to
any of the arguments of the utility functionI e u is assumed to refer
to a risk neutral individual. This assumption could be relaxed without
altering anything important in the argument, but it is an expository con-
venience.
71t is notnecessary for the present purpose to analyze the determinants
of w. It may be reasonable tosuppose that the expected return per holdupF—4
increases with per capita wealth, but the effect of increased per capita
wealth on the provision of self—protection might conceivably outweigh the
direct effect of per capita wealth. In any case, nothing in the paper
depends upon the direction of the wealth effect on the return to a criminal
act.
Expected punishment criminal act is determined by B and R, but
expected punishment 2 hour spent in criminal activity is not. For
simplicity, therefore, posit a fixed number of criminal acts per hour.
8That is, R is defined as including (1) the rights of apprehended
persons to due process and (2) of convicted persons to "appropriate and
equitable" treatment in the sentencing and administration of punishment.
Hence, a complete specification of R, given B and the transformation func-
tion, determines the expected probability of apprehension, the expected
probability of conviction if apprehended, and the expected utility loss, if
convicted.
9substituting (5) into (3) gives
=
4g[we, W, w1, B,R,T), T]
and substituting (4) Into (2) yields
F I.g[Wc W, wp (B, R, T) TI R,B?
=o, or
L g )
F*(I, B, R) =0for given w, W, w1, and T.
1-°The deep philosophical issue that underlies these two ways of analyzing
the role of citizen rights In a model of social choice cannot be settled by
considerations of analytical convenience.However, considering possibleF-5
tradeoffs between cit Lzen rights and expenditure on law enforcementsuggests
a viewpoint on rights that will appear intriguing to some and outrageous
to others.
11For example, law abiders would (personally)rather have less rights
and more expenditure by LES than potential criminals. In avery interesting
paper, Harris [6] stresses the difference in the relative importance
attached to reducing crime vis—a—vis avoiding erroneous convictionsby
persons who are more and those who are less likely to be accused of crimes.
Harris follows the approach of Becker's pioneering work t7] inmaking the
objective function of LES a social loss function from criminal activity and
from attempts to repress crime. This loss function isanalogous to the
utility function (1). While I prefer my formulation to that of Becker and
Harris, the differences are not important in the present context.
Harris' argument, in effect, is concerned with onetype of right; the
right(s) of falsely accused persons. The approach of thispaper deals
with rights more generally, and also considers them froma somewhat different
perspective than does Harris.
12i am indebted to Richard Auster fordiscussion on this point.
13By verified, I mean attested to by witnessesacceptable to LES. It
is to be emphasized that this is an assumption made forexposition only,, and
that in some cases it may be contrary to fact. Forexample, if the cost of
enforcing the reporting requirement were very great, all that sucha
requirement might accomplish would be to insure that street crime and failure
to report movements would be almost perfectly correlated. For thesake of
the argument, I abstract from this possibility. Iam indebted to William
Landes for a discussion of this point.F-6
1-4That is, it is assumed that the substitution effect of a change in
relative prices dominates the wealth effect if either input is inferior.
15See the New York Times, October 5—18, 1970.
-6See for example Hirschleifer [2], Dacy and Kunreuther [3],Douty [4].
17[8] contains a good discussion of the history, rationale and admini-
stration of curfew laws. On p. 102 it reports the outcome of a survey of
109 (large) cities during the summer of 1957 as to the status of their curfew
regulations, if any. Of the 109 cities surveyed, 103 responded, and of these
55 per cent had some sort of curfew regulation applying mainly to juveniles.
The vigor with which these ordinances were enforced typically reflected the
view of the enforcement authorities as to the need for reducing street crime
and the contribution of the curfew to that objective.
-8There is a substantial literature on the role andpurpose of vagrancy
laws as instruments to reduce the incidence of crime. Two recent discussions
are [91 and [10].
19This assumes that the probability thatan indicted person will commit
a further crime before trial is greater than the probability that an unin—
dicted person will do so during the same period. On this point, see Landes
[51.
20This might be viewed as an example of howprivate protection increases
in response to a rise in T. However, the important point is that citizen
rights in quasi—public places (publicly supported universities) are curbed,
with the apparent acquiesence of the courts, for the purpose of blunting
the effect on I of an increase in T.F— 7
21This point is well developed by Landes [5].
229 cit.
230ne critic has argued that to make Rvariable would be to increase
(individual) uncertainty concerning one's rights which would reduce utility
directly (for risk averse individuals) and would also increase the cost of
planning future productive activities. However, a rigid R in the face of
shifts in exogenous paramenters (T, W, etc.) would not necessarily reduce
uncertainty about future utility levels. Consider: the right to assemble
may cause only a slight inconvenience to non—participants (because of traffic
delay) if the number involved Is (say) 5,000. The inconvenience——loss of
utility——would be very much greater If the number were 100,000. A judicial
policy of minimizing variance of utility from exercise of the right to
assemble might well make this right conditional upon the prospective number
of persons involved and, especially, upon the prospective loss ofutility to
third parties.
In other words, a rigid interpretation of citizen rights in the face
of changing objective circumstances may lead to variations inutility to
affected parties that may exceed the variation arising from amore flexible
interpretation. This is not intended as an argument for, or against,
flexibility in interpreting citizen rights but only as a caveat against the
presumption that judicial rigidity in this context tends to reduce uncertainty
On this point, I am indebted to Ben Klein.
more exactly, to deny courts the right to set lower limits to R
beneath which the legislature may not reduce R to achievemore favorable
combinations of B and I.F— 8
is not descriptively accurate to describe the powers ofgovernment
as being delegated by individuals, or to specify that the relation of
governnierlt officials to individuals is akin to that of agents to principals.
These assumptions are used here in an "as if" sense to facilitate exposition.
26The idea of anagent or an employee shirking his task is expounded at
length by Alchian and Demsetz [11], pp. .Itshould be noted •that the
risk of "shirking" by an agent——akin to moral hazard——is only one ofmany
sources of divergence between optimal behavior from the viewpoint either of
agent or of principal. Such divergences may arise from any divergence In
the optimizing behavior of an agent from that of a principal. Whatever its
cause, whenever such a divergence arises, the problem of controlling the
agent will arise.
good example of this point of view is Dworkin [121. van den Haag
[13] gives a trenchant criticism of Dworkin's argument.References
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